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Summary 
The outcome of the disputed presidential elections 
in Ukraine in November 2004 is still highly 
uncertain. It is however clear that it will have 
profound consequences for the EU’s relationship 
with Ukraine. The authors suggest the 
development of a three-pronged EU approach.  
First, the EU needs to develop strategies to 
support the democratic transmission of power 
from President Leonid Kuchma to his successor. 
In the event of violence being instigated by the 
authorities, it is suggested that the EU 
immediately suspend all contacts with the 
Ukrainian leadership. If the Supreme Court finds 
that the result cannot be said to reflect the will of 
the Ukrainian people, new elections run by the 
OSCE should be considered. 
Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal 
with the consequences of a victory for Prime 
Minister Viktor Yanukovych. It would be 
imperative that the EU resists the temptation to 
disengage with Ukraine. The EU would 
nevertheless need to radically change its policy, 
for instance by re-targeting economic aid and 
minimising political dialogue. 
Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the 
event that Viktor Yushchenko wins the 
presidency. In this case, the EU and Ukraine 
should in the short-term renegotiate the Action 
Plan to strengthen bilateral relations. Faced with a 
pro-European, credible reformist like Mr 
Yushchenko, with broad domestic support, the EU 
would in the longer term find it difficult to 
continue to avoid the question of Ukraine as a 
potential member of the EU. 
Introduction 
The outcome of the disputed presidential elections in 
Ukraine is still uncertain. It is however clear that the 
Orange Revolution of November 2004 will have profound 
consequences for Europe and the EU’s relationship with 
Ukraine. Since the second round of presidential elections 
on 21 November, the Ukrainian people have shown the 
strength of their desire for Ukraine to be a pluralistic 
democracy. It is therefore essential that Europe responds 
with equal determination to support the aspirations of the 
Ukrainian electorate. 
It is abundantly clear that the elections were falsified by the 
Ukrainian authorities. This view is now endorsed by a 
number of bodies ranging from the Ukrainian parliament, to 
the EU, EU member states, the OSCE and the US, all of 
which have refused to recognise Prime Minister Victor 
Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine. In contrast, 
Russia has done so. 
The next stage in the ensuing turmoil in Ukraine is unclear, 
as from a legal point of view, Ukraine has fallen into a 
political vacuum. It is apparent that the struggle between 
the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition is not over. 
Owing to proclamations made by senior political figures in 
the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine for regional 
autonomy, the spectre of secession has arisen in Ukraine, 
with its potential disintegration into what observers (in the 
EU and US) have referred to as a ‘West and East’. It needs 
to be emphasised that this is an oversimplification. The 
issue of separation is limited to the south-eastern regions of 
Ukraine, namely Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych has his power base. 
With a combined population of more than 7 million, or 
15% of Ukraine’s total population, these two regions 
contain much of Ukraine’s natural resources. They are also 
the home to important industries such as steel and mining 
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that have played a crucial role in the recent economic 
upturn in Ukraine. While these moves towards greater 
regional autonomy are significant, as things stand the 
likelihood of them leading to secession is exaggerated. The 
disintegration of Ukraine is improbable. 
A victory for the opposition in any subsequent rounds is a 
likely outcome, although far from certain; a victory for the 
current authorities is still possible. Either way, the EU will 
need to develop a clear strategy on Ukraine for the 
immediate future and the coming months and years. 
Three strategies are needed: 
First, the EU needs to develop approaches to support the 
democratic transmission of power from President Kuchma 
to his successor (immediate strategy). 
Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal with the 
consequences of a victory for Mr Yanukovych (or that of 
any other person representing the current authorities) 
(medium-term strategy). 
Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the event of Mr 
Viktor Yushchenko winning the presidency (medium- and 
long-term strategy). 
Strategy 1: Support for the democratic 
transmission of power from President Kuchma to 
a successor 
The EU’s declaration issued by the Dutch EU Presidency 
on Monday 22 November was appropriate, and rather 
strong by EU standards. The declaration stated that the EU 
would discuss, “without delay”, possible “further steps” 
with the OSCE chairman-in-office.
1 The declaration by the 
Presidency of the EU on Ukraine from 24 November 2004 
was also a step in right direction in that the EU did not 
acknowledge the final results announced by Ukraine’s 
Central Election Committee. 
The EU should now spell out these “further steps”. The EU 
should first of all make it clear that, in the event of violence 
being instigated by the authorities, it will immediately 
suspend all contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. A travel 
ban on those leaders, such as the one recently imposed on 
the Belarusian leadership, should be instituted and any 
assets held in Western banks by those involved should be 
frozen. 
At the same time the EU needs to make it clear that the 
political crisis should be resolved as soon as possible and 
that stalling tactics on the part of Ukrainian authorities are 
not acceptable. The matter needs to be resolved in weeks, 
not months. The mediation effort by the EU’s High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Javier Solana, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski 
and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus has been a 
welcome example of EU engagement in the crisis. The EU 
                                                 
1  See the extract from the successive General Affairs & 
External Relations Councils, 22-23 November 2004, item 
debated (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
external_relations/ukraine/intro/gac.htm#uk221104).  
needs to express its willingness to continue to mediate in 
the event of a deterioration of the situation in Ukraine. 
If the review of the election process and its results by the 
Rada and Supreme Court finds evidence of fraud such that 
the result cannot be determined or said to reflect the will of 
the Ukrainian people, new elections run by the OSCE 
should be considered (the OSCE has run elections in 
Bosnia and could do so in Ukraine). The EU and the 
international community more broadly should show its 
willingness to participate and support these new elections, 
if it is decided that they are to take place. 
The EU should keep Russia informed as to its opinion on 
Ukraine. The discussions between the Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands, Jan Peter Balkenende and the President of 
Russia, Vladimir Putin during the EU-Russia summit in 
The Hague were a good beginning. The EU should 
continue to make cooperation in Ukraine and other areas of 
the ‘common neighbourhood’ a condition for further 
cooperation on international security issues. 
The EU’s efforts to promote a democratic, peaceful 
solution to the political crisis in Ukraine should be 
coordinated with the US and Canada. A meeting of high-
level officials from both sides should be considered. These 
efforts need to be intensified through bilateral contacts and 
in international organisations such as the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE and NATO. 
Strategy 2: Reactions to a Yanukovych presidency 
It is imperative that in the event of a Yanukovych victory 
(or another representative of the current regime) in any 
subsequent elections, the EU resists the temptation to 
disengage with Ukraine, as occurred in the case of Belarus 
when President Alexander Lukashenko usurped power. 
Arguably it is precisely the lack of EU engagement with 
Ukraine that may have contributed to the current situation. 
A more appropriate model is Yugoslavia in 2000, where 
Europe and the international community provided crucial 
support and encouragement to the democratic forces in the 
country, leading to the fall of former Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic’s regime by peaceful, democratic 
means. 
In the event that Mr Yanukovych is acknowledged as the 
winner, the EU will need to radically change its policy. 
Economic aid to Ukraine should be re-targeted away from 
technical assistance for the approximation of economic 
legislation to the EU acquis, investment support for 
infrastructure networks, etc. Instead, the EU should offer 
strong and immediate ‘political assistance’ to support a 
pluralistic, democratic Ukraine, with increased and direct 
support for political parties, civil society, free media, etc. 
The EU could learn from the US in this respect. Indeed, the 
EU has been conspicuous by its absence in Ukraine. 
Any political dialogue with the executive power should be 
suspended or minimised until either a) new presidential 
elections, or in the event that these are not to take place b) 
parliamentary elections in spring 2006. After either of 
those, the situation in Ukraine should be reviewed. In UKRAINE AND THE EU AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION | 3 
 
addition, the EU should cooperate closely with the 
Ukrainian parliament where the opposition is strong.  
Strategy 3: Special strategy for Ukraine under a 
Yushchenko presidency 
A Yushchenko victory would pose a profound challenge for 
Europe and the EU. Indeed, on one level the EU may find it 
more difficult to deal with a Ukraine under a President 
Yushchenko than a Ukraine led by a President 
Yanukovych. There are two reasons for this: 1) Mr 
Yushchenko is serious about domestic reform and 2) he is 
committed to Ukraine’s eventual membership of the EU. 
In contrast to President Kuchma, who also was ostensibly 
in favour of eventual accession to the EU, under Mr 
Yushchenko a push towards EU membership will become 
credible, as it is likely to be accompanied by economic and 
political reform. As Prime Minister in 1999-2001, Mr 
Yushchenko pushed vigorously for economic reforms. 
Indeed, the threat such reforms posed to powerful oligarchs 
closely associated with President Kuchma was the reason 
he was dismissed. While there are vested interests against 
serious reform in Ukraine, a President Yushchenko would 
be supported by what appears to be a comfortable majority 
in the Ukrainian parliament. Crucially, judging by the 
ongoing mass demonstrations, he enjoys strong popular 
support, making implementation of difficult reforms more 
likely. 
His immediate task would be to gain the trust and support 
of the large number of voters in the east and south who 
voted for Mr Yanukovych. Populist measures to improve 
the situation of the masses can be expected. These can be 
afforded owing to current strong economic growth in 
Ukraine. Indeed, not reversing the increase in pensions and 
student grants introduced by Prime Minister Yanukovych in 
his bid for the presidency may be a wise strategy. Re-
launching the privatisation process halted by President 
Kuchma before the elections could further bolster state 
finances until the impact of expected economic reforms 
take effect. 
Economic and political reforms are likely to be 
accompanied by vigorous lobbying by the new president 
and his government for immediate measures from the EU. 
In particular, the recently negotiated Action Plan to 
strengthen bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine 
as part of the EU’s new European Neighbourhood Policy is 
unlikely to be acceptable to a President Yushchenko. (It 
was originally planned that the Action Plan would be 
endorsed in early December. But it is obvious that the EU 
should not sign the Action Plan until after the political 
crisis in Ukraine.) The Action Plan consists of long lists of 
political criteria that Ukraine would have to fulfil as well as 
specific measures to implement the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Apart from minor new 
commitments in the short-term and vague promises for 
closer relations in the medium-term, the Action Plan offers 
no specific commitments from the EU that would 
noticeably strengthen relations with Ukraine. 
A new Action Plan should thus be negotiated as soon as the 
situation in Ukraine is clear and a new Ukrainian 
government is in place, as tangible proof of the EU’s 
commitment to a democratic, pluralistic Ukraine. This 
should include a number of immediate measures such as the 
EU endowing Ukraine market-economy status for anti-
dumping purposes, as the EU did with Russia in 2002, 
removing quantitative restrictions on steel imports from 
Ukraine and starting negotiations on a visa-facilitation 
agreement. The EU should also be more generous in terms 
of Ukraine’s participation and inclusion in EU programmes 
and agencies. 
The EU should further live up to its promise of increasing 
economic assistance to Ukraine. The Union could take the 
lead in organising a donor conference, as was done for 
Georgia following its ‘Rose Revolution’ in late 2003, for a 
combined effort by the international community to support 
Ukraine. The EU and its member countries, the US, 
Canada, Japan and the international financial institutions 
should take part in the conference. These efforts should be 
bolstered by common EU-US actions supporting Ukraine or 
at least some form of coordination of activities. The special 
role of Canada in transatlantic activities towards Ukraine 
would be welcomed. 
A President Yushchenko is, however, unlikely to settle for 
an upgraded Action Plan. His stated long-term goal is EU 
membership for Ukraine. Faced with a pro-European 
reformist like President Yushchenko, bolstered by broad 
parliamentary and popular support, the EU will find it 
difficult to continue its current policy of ‘welcoming 
Ukraine’s European aspirations’ without acknowledging 
Ukraine as a candidate. 
Coming on the eve of the European Council on 16-17 
December, the Orange Revolution poses a fundamental 
challenge for the EU. Widely expected to endorse the 
beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey, European 
leaders now have to confront with utmost seriousness the 
demand from Ukraine of being acknowledged as a 
candidate for EU membership. 
The EU finds itself a victim of its own rules, more 
specifically Art. 49 of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union, which states that any European country may 
become a member, and the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for 
membership. Faced with a European country that fulfils 
these criteria, there is little the EU can do in the end. 
The abrogation of one of the principal tenets of EU 
integration – that the Union is open to all European 
countries that fulfil the stated criteria of membership – 
would represent a fundamental break with the basic values 
on which the EU is based. To do this for the sake of 
political convenience (to avoid a complicated decision-
making process) would be a dramatic break with more than 
50 years of European history and a break with Europe’s 
proudest achievements. It would also be a betrayal of the 
people of Ukraine who have taken to the streets to defend 
their democratic rights. This is the principal challenge 
posed to Europe by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.  
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